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Introduction
After fi nancial crisis in 2008, both fi nancial and 
non-fi nancial institutions, governments and 
monetary authorities as regulators faced great 
challenges in overcoming recent depression. 
Although different market participants in 
different fi elds reacted and accommodated 
in their own ways, they relied on monetary 
authorities more than they did before crisis. 
Monetary authorities were in position to deliver 
policies accommodative enough to stimulate 
economy, or at least reduce damage cumulated 
during crisis period. From our point of view, fi rst 
step was pushing interest rates near zero level 
or lower in order to loosen borrowing conditions. 
But, on the other hand, monetary authorities 
approached to changes in legislation in order 
to prevent situation that caused crisis in the fi rst 
place. In other words, meeting requirements 
for getting access to capital become stricter. 
Once zero-lower bound (ZLB) was reached, 
and there was no sign of substantial economic 
recovery and growth in mid-term horizon, 
central banks moved towards unconventional 
monetary policies (the Federal Reserve System 
and later the European Central Bank, besides 
them, also Bank of England and much sooner 
bank of Japan implemented these policies) 
via implementing unconventional instruments. 
Considering volume, assets included, and time 
period, the quantitative easing (QE) drags most 
attention.
This instrument was fi rstly used by Bank 
of Japan in order to fi ght defl ation, while 
effectiveness was questioned among the 
academics, partially because of some specifi cs 
of Japan´s fi nancial sector. The European 
Central Bank (ECB) implemented proper QE 
back in the beginning of 2015 (QE ended 
in December 2018). Some unconventional 
instruments took place in late 2008, however, 
considering volume and assets included, we 
do not consider them as a proper QE. In the 
US, fi rst QE began in 2008 and last programme 
ended up in 2014, excessing $4.5tn of assets 
bought in total under such programmes. While 
fi nding robust and strong evidence among the 
literature about lowering both corporate and 
government bond yields across the yield curve, 
considering large volumes of capital used for 
this policy, participants and assets included and 
affected, potential spill-overs and topicality, we 
fi nd it benefi cial to examine effects of particular 
non-standard policy, from different, less 
examined perspective – on equity markets. In 
this paper we focus on situation in the US, mainly 
because of fact, that even though programme 
has ended, effects on equity markets remain 
undiscovered, and fi ndings of market reactions 
to QE related information could become useful 
both for profi ting or hedging during possible 
similar situations in the future. For that purpose, 
we will use the benchmark equity indices as 
representatives of the equity markets in the US.
This work is structured as follows; fi rstly, 
we provide necessary information about 
unconventional monetary policy and QE in 
general. Next, we present review of research 
of other authors aiming this topic together with 
description of process of QE in the US. Second 
chapter present methodology and data used for 
our empirical analysis. Third chapter presents 
our results, followed by discussion. Final 
chapter concludes.
1. Unconventional Monetary Policy
Before fi nancial crisis in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively, standard or conventional 
monetary policies were oriented mainly 
on keeping infl ation low and stable. This 
approach seemed secure enough, with no big 
obstructions in implementing. Main instruments 
were short-term interest rates, at which 
funding to banks and interbank markets was 
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provided, while impact of this policy on both 
market interest rates and broader economy 
was reliably quantifi ed. For setting suitable 
base interest rates monetary authorities 
usually used the Taylor-type rule calculations 
or referred to models based on expectations of 
future macroeconomic indicators, considering 
wide macroeconomic data (Woodford, 2001; 
Orphanides, 2003; Orphanides, 2010; Taylor, 
2009; Taylor & Davradakis, 2006). To simplify, 
the interest rates were linked mainly to changes 
in the infl ation and the output gap, while this way 
of handling monetary policy was easy to predict 
and effective in order to keep infl ation from 
rising (todays´ monetary authorities’ practices 
are more based upon more sophisticated 
methods such as forecast targeting, see e.g. 
Svensson, 2018).
After economies all over the world witnessed 
crushing years, new challenges came up for 
policymakers. Firstly, it was strong trend in 
implementing actions in order to prevent next 
bubbles forming in the markets, which logically 
lead to more regulations and tightening of 
fi nancial legislation. On the other hand, second 
great challenge for central bankers was fi nding 
the way how to support very slow economic 
recovery, hence central bankers become very 
important market participants in almost intraday 
view.
Setting monetary policy in order to secure 
sustainable recovery was complicated, at least 
because of the current interest rates. The interest 
rates were kept at zero level or close by central 
banks, as Taylor-type rules indicated because 
of current state of macroeconomic indicators. 
Consequently, phenomenon called “zero-lower 
bound” (ZLB) occurred, regarding to fact, that 
keeping cash positions bears no interest, hence 
market interest rates are effectively bounded 
to zero level. Thus, traditional relationship 
between base interest rate set up by central 
bank and market interest rates become 
obsolete (see e.g. Bernanke et al., 2004; 
Gagnon et al., 2011; Joyce, 2012; Joyce et al. 
2010). In addition, after huge losses that came 
along with crisis, many market participants, 
including fi nancial and non-fi nancial sector and 
other individuals, became much less solvent 
compared to period before crisis. In other 
words, the market participants were short of 
liquidity. Other factor was, that after period of 
losses, banks were more likely improving their 
balance sheets rather than providing capital 
further via lending to private sector. Therefore, 
at this point, the conventional monetary policies 
become ineffective: the monetary rules failed 
as effective instrument used to set appropriate 
base interest rates, because these rates did not 
have required effect on market interest rates, 
while very cautious banks deviated from usual 
fi nancial intermediation. To sum up, in this 
situation, well known and usual transmission 
channel of monetary policy did not work, and 
monetary authorities were expected to bring 
something new in order to give some positive 
stimulus to the markets. Central bankers then 
reversed this channel and moved towards 
targeting on quantity variables, in order to set 
interest rates via fl uctuations and changes in 
bank´s reserves with aim to provide enough 
credit to banks to support lending (Joyce, 2012; 
Gagnon et al., 2011). As Fratzscher et al. (2017) 
suggests, besides more standard counter-
cyclical policies, the FED introduced new set of 
non-standard (often labelled as credit easing) 
instruments.
For purposes of this paper, we will be dealing 
only with high profi le form of unconventional 
monetary policy – so called quantitative easing. 
Reason for this decision lays on the fact that 
the QE is the most signifi cant instrument among 
the other unconventional monetary policy 
instruments considering volume and spectrum 
of assets included. The term QE was fi rstly used 
in line with Japan´s situation that followed real 
estate bubble burst, and defl ationary pressures 
that consequently occurred in the 1990s. With 
interest rates at a zero-lower bound (ZLB), 
the Bank of Japan (BoJ) decided to boost 
banks´ cash reserves by purchasing assets – 
government bonds – from banks. The main idea 
was that providing cash to banks will support 
lending across the market and consequently 
extenuate defl ationary pressures, once banks 
will achieve required level of cash reserves.
1.1 Quantitative Easing – Proceedings 
in the US
Gradually, the QE (QE is also labelled as Large-
Scale Asset Purchase) as a policy instrument 
was adopted by the FED, Bank of England 
and ECB. Bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers 
in 2008 showed, that many assets held by 
banking sector in the US were “toxic” – in other 
words, with default rating after revision. Distrust 
of the fi nancial institutions led to stagnation 
of the credit market. The FED decided to 
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approach the QE in order to support the credit 
market by purchasing mainly these toxic assets 
– replacing them with cash, from banks´ point 
of view. In November 2008 the FED started 
purchasing mortgage-backed securities (MBS), 
government bonds and bonds of government 
mortgage agencies (it extended the programme 
in March 2009). So-called QE1 (volume of QE1 
was divided as follow: government bonds – 
$300bn, government mortgage agencies – 
$200bn, MBS – $1.25tn) lasted from November 
2008 to March 2010. This “fi rst” wave of QE 
was oriented on supporting bank´s health. 
Nevertheless, the banks were sceptic about 
uncertain future development, therefore they 
kept their cash positions instead of transferring 
money to other subjects – which lead to situation 
labelled as liquidity trap. Consequently, in 
November 2010 the FED approached to the 
next “wave” of quantitative easing – QE2 – with 
aim to support economy´s weak performance 
by purchasing additional government bonds 
(total volume of QE2 was $600bn). It was 
expected, that rising bond prices will encourage 
interest in capital market (generally speaking 
– riskier investments), increase domestic 
demand and support exports after decreasing 
exchange rate of dollar. The QE2 lasted till Jun 
2011 with monthly pace of purchases at $75bn. 
In September 2012 the FED announced, that 
without more intervention, fragile economic 
recovery could not become substantial, 
improvement on labour market could not 
become persistent and infl ation would not reach 
infl ation target – at or below 2%. In spite of this 
doubt, the FED launched third quantitative 
easing (QE3). The QE3 was fi rstly kept at 
monthly pace of $40bn MBS purchases, with 
unspecifi ed time frame. Instead of announcing 
expected duration of this programme, the FED 
announced commitment to continue in its 
policy until substantial recovery on the labour 
market will be achieved, with respect to the 
price stability. In addition, in December 2012, 
the FED started buying government bonds in 
monthly pace $45bn as a consequence of the 
“Extended Duration Programme”. The FED 
ended QE3 program in October 2014 (Gilchrist, 
2014; Weale & Wieladek 2016).
All mentioned purchases infl ated the FED´s 
balance sheet signifi cantly. From the pre-crisis 
period, when balance-sheet was at a level of 
$800bn, it rose to almost $4.5tn at the end 
of the QE programmes. In some point, the 
central banks decide to unwind their balance 
sheets, which we consider as a consequence 
of the QE, also as the policy normalization, 
and therefore the consequences and the 
effects of balance-sheet unwinding should be 
subject of attention regarding the QE. With 
respect to policy normalization, we mention so-
called “taper tantrum” in 2013, when the FED 
announced reducing monthly pace of purchases 
by $10bn from current $85bn every next 
meeting onwards. This information resonated 
throughout fi nancial markets strongly, proving 
strong spill-over effect and disrupted both fi xed 
income and equity trading for some period, 
causing sell-offs in domestic markets same 
as in emerging markets´ credit and equities 
(see e.g. MacDonald, 2017; Fratzscher et al., 
2017). In September 2017, the FED announced 
unwinding its balance sheet in moderated 
monthly pace of $10bn of expiring securities 
(divided as $4bn of MBS and $6bn of securities, 
with aim to reach monthly pace of $20bn of 
MBS and $30bn of securities, till balance sheet 
shrinks to $3tn), and logically we consider the 
effects related to this operation as a potential 
subject of further and more complex research 
of the QE. 
1.2 Research Review
Across the literature, we fi nd that research 
mainstream linked to the QE topic is oriented 
on bond yields, while consensus among 
the authors suggests, that the QE lowered 
both corporate and government bond yields 
persistently along the yield curve, generally 
accepting that impact of the QE on bond yields 
is fi rst and crucial step for other broader effects. 
Concentrating specifi cally on the US, we can 
fi nd slightly different results using mainly two 
methodological approaches – VAR (Vector 
Autoregression) models and their modifi cations 
for broader macroeconomic effects, and event-
study approach for instant effects caused by 
information about the QE.
Chung et al. (2012) is dealing with the ZLB 
situation after crisis in the US, but even if authors 
agree upon that the ZLB was highly anticipated 
and predicted given the circumstances, 
they question persistency of the ZLB. Using 
the DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium) and VAR models, authors come to 
different predictions (depending on the model 
specifi cations) about how long should the ZLB 
last. Despite contradictory predictions about the 
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ZLB duration, they fi nd the intersections among 
the models used, suggesting that short-term 
yields decreased signifi cantly.
Altavilla and Giannone (2014) adopt event-
study to estimate perceived effects of the UMP 
on long-term bond yields performing analysis 
of revisions of predictions of professional 
forecasters around the announcement and 
implementation of policy decisions given by the 
FOMC, the FED respectively, after the crisis. 
Authors provide results showing signifi cant 
and persistent drop in long-term bond yields, 
adding that the information is priced into bonds 
immediately after the announcement.
Here we would like to point out, that 
despite the event-study is widely used 
among the authors (Gagnon et al., 2011; 
Wright, 2012; Bauer et al., 2014; Swanson, 
2011; Joyce et al., 2010), Thornton (2017) 
proves that the event-study approach and 
its modifi cations with the announcements 
used as events cannot provide statistically 
signifi cant information about the persistence 
and durability of effects caused on bond 
yields by those announcements, therefore 
this approach cannot be used to examine 
effectiveness of the QE in its complexity.
Broader study of Hausken and Ncube 
(2013) examines both effects of the QE on 
interest rates and yields, respectively, and 
broader economic effects of the QE using 
the event-study and the Bayesian Vector 
Autoregressive (BVAR) methods. Results from 
the event-studies of Japan, the UK, the US and 
the EU are in line with other authors – the QE 
caused drop in yields signifi cantly, affecting the 
whole yield curve. In addition, authors provide 
evidence, that the FED and the BoE were more 
effective in lowering yields compared to the BoJ 
and the ECB. The BVAR methods were used to 
examine effects of the QE on the infl ation and 
the GDP (Gross Domestic Product). Authors 
present that, in general for all four regions, 
effects of the QE on the GDP were rather 
limited, or insignifi cant. On the other hand, in 
order to push infl ation higher, the QE is effective 
tool in the ZLB according to the BVAR results 
presented in this study.
Also using the BVAR models, different 
results are presented in study provided by 
Weale and Wieladek (2016). The study is 
dealing with impact of the announcements of 
large-scale purchases of government bonds 
on the real GDP and the CPI in the US and 
the UK. Within their BVAR models author use 
four different identifi cation schemes, all leaving 
reactions of the GDP and the CPI unrestricted. 
Results from this study claim, that in aftermath 
of fi nancial crisis, both the BoE´s and the FED´s 
asset purchases were effective in supporting 
the GDP. Authors estimate, that the asset 
purchasing related shock caused by the central 
bank purchasing government bonds worth 1% 
of the nominal GDP has resulted in increasing 
of 0.62% of the real GDP and 0.58% in the 
CPI (Consumer price index) in the US. For the 
UK increases are 0.25% for the real GDP and 
0.32% for the CPI. Study also provides solid 
explanations of these effects throughout the 
transmission channels discussed in previous 
chapter. Similar results for the UK we fi nd in 
Kapetanios et al. (2012), where authors used 
the BVAR and VAR models. This study is 
focused only on the UK and the main challenge 
for authors is to examine the macroeconomic 
impact of fi rst round of the QE run by the BoE. 
They also fi nd both the CPI and GDP positively 
implied by the QE via short-term yields. Among 
literature, we witness mainly the VAR, BVAR, 
regressions and event-studies.
Considering methodological approaches, 
we fi nd research by D’Amico and King (2013) 
very specifi c compared to other studies. Authors 
used their own approach, they add “supply 
channel” – not in line with classic transmission 
channels – to consideration and to calculate 
the “stock” and “fl ow” effects as an explanatory 
part of local-supply channel. The “stock effects” 
are defi ned as persistent changes in prices 
that result from movements along the Treasury 
demand curves, while the “fl ow effects” are 
defi ned as the response of prices to the 
ongoing purchase operations and could refl ect, 
on top of the portfolio rebalancing activity due 
to the outcome of the purchases, impairments 
in liquidity and functioning, that lead to sluggish 
price discovery. They are oriented on explaining 
changes in yields of substitutes to assets 
directly purchased under the LSAP. Except for 
reducing yields, results from both the “stock” 
and “fl ow” effects are supporting the preferred-
habitat theories, which are suggesting that 
treasuries at a given maturity can be sensitive 
to the amount of privately held treasury debt 
available with similar maturity. Term referring to 
“habits” of investors, meaning they will prefer 
some type of investment considering mainly 
duration, because of their portfolio strategy. 
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Study results further indicate that, on the days 
when a security was eligible to be bought, 
purchases of securities with similar maturities 
had almost as large effects on its yield as did 
purchases of the security itself. These results 
are consistent with Greenwood (2005), Gabaix 
et al. (2007), Vayanos and Vila (2009), and 
Greenwood and Vayanos (2010).
Besides larger VAR models, there is rich 
representation of event-studies among the 
literature connected to the QE in almost every 
region/country, but mostly examining effects 
on the bonds (yields, respectively) or foreign 
exchange rates. In addition, Henseler (2018) 
uses the event-study to examine cross sectional 
variation in non-fi nancial fi rms, concluding 
that the announcement returns are positively 
correlated with leverage and negatively with 
size of the company. Shah et al. (2018) adds 
evidence that the QE caused reduction in the 
equity risk premium for the S&P500 using VAR, 
which led to increase in the equity prices of 
9.6% over the longer observed period (from 
1974 to 2017). Also, Su and Hung (2017) 
argues that the QE had positive effects on the 
stock markets from 2003 to 2014. Hence, we 
decided to examine effects of the QE related 
information to the equity/stock markets from 
intraday perspective, which we consider easier 
available compared to the bond markets for 
small investors or traders. On the other hand, 
changes in the stock market prices could 
signalize if the portfolio rebalancing channel 
caused additional infl ows or outfl ows to equities, 
even though Fratzscher et al. (2017) argues 
that the QE had more signifi cant effects in 
portfolio decision making over the longer term, 
adding that the information was not fully priced 
in immediately after the announcement. In other 
words, aim of this paper is to determine whether 
the information related to the unconventional 
monetary policy, provided by monetary 
authority, has positive or negative impact on 
the stock markets via examining returns on 
the benchmark indices on announcement 
days, while we take into account character of 
the announcement. To keep our research as 
useful as possible, we decided to work with 
announcements of the FED, examining their 
intraday effect on the benchmark indices using 
event-study approach. This should represent 
microeconomic implications, considering that 
the QE linked information is priced in not only 
in the bond markets but also in the equity 
markets immediately, therefore they represent 
reaction of the market participants to particular 
information. Examining market reaction to this 
type of information could either bring profi t via 
opening a position in advance or help to hedge 
against loses via closing the already opened 
positions. 
2. Methodology and Data
To examine effects of announcements on the 
stock markets, we use the standard event-study 
methodology to determine the excess returns 
(see e.g. MacKinlay, 1997). Abnormal returns 
will be analysed in same time point (day) as the 
announcement is released (announcements 
are released usually in the afternoon, while 
markets close several hours later, which gives 
us enough time to absorb information contained 
in particular announcement) using average 
returns (Brown & Warner, 1985) calculated from 
previous sixty days:
, (1)
 
(2)
where AAD represents the excess return on 
the announcement day (AD) of the particular 
index, RAD is return of the particular index on the announcement day calculated as difference 
between closing prices on the announcement 
day and the previous day and 
_
tR  is the average 
return on particular index considering sixty 
days before announcement. For purposes of 
this study, we consider AAD as a key indicator 
that helps us to determine effect of the QE 
related statements on the equity markets, 
while persistence of those effects cannot be 
examined using only this methodology (see 
Thornton, 2017). We used daily close prices 
of main equity indices representing the US 
equity markets (DJIA, S&P500, NASDAQ, 
Russell2000), while the returns/changes 
were calculated as percentages. The returns 
on announcement days were removed from 
sample so average returns were calculated 
without being contaminated by the excess 
returns on the announcement days. The 
DJIA index (Dow Jones Industrial Average) 
represents 30 biggest blue-chip companies in 
the US, the S&P500 (Sandard´s & Poor´s 500) 
represents 500 biggest large-cap companies in 
the US, the Russell2000 represents 2000 small-
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cap companies in the US and the NASDAQ 
represents 100 biggest non-fi nancial mainly 
technology companies in the US.
With this indicator we try to approximate 
how daily returns on the indices deviate on 
particular announcement day from its average 
performance during the previous sixty days. 
Even though persistency of these effects can 
be questioned, we get solid information about 
sentiment brought to market participants by 
the FED, in order to fi nd out if such a policy is 
positive or negative impulse for the equities, 
which we consider as a main advantage of this 
methodology.
In Tab. 1 below we present announcements 
considered as events, compiled of every 
single press release of the FED from 2008 
to 2017, which contained the QE related 
information. Table shows what type of meeting 
or announcement on which particular day (fi rst 
two columns) provided information linked to 
which particular QE programme. 
Date Event Description
13.12.2017 FOMC Statement Continued unwinding balance sheet at monthly pace $10 billion from October 2017.
20.09.2017 FOMC Statement Starting to unwind balance sheet at monthly pace $10 billion in October 2017.
14.06.2017 FOMC Statement Announcing, that balance sheet normalization programme will begin in October 2017.
29.10.2014 FOMC Statement QE3 ends.
18.12.2013 FOMC Statement QE3 will be tapered at $10 billion monthly pace every meeting.
12.12.2012 FOMC Statement
QE3 expanded: The Fed will continue to purchase $45 billion 
of long-term Treasuries per month but will no longer sterilize 
purchases through the sale of short-term treasuries.
13.09.2012 FOMC Statement
QE3 announced: The Fed will purchase $40 billion of MBS per 
month as long as “the outlook for the labour market does not 
improve substantially…in the context of stability.”
22.08.2012 FOMC minutes released
FOMC members “judged that additional monetary accommodation 
would likely be warranted fairly so on...“
20.06.2012 FOMC Statement
Maturity Extension Program extended: The Fed will continue 
to purchase long-term securities and sell short-term securities 
through the end of 2012. Purchases/sales will continue at the 
current pace, about $45 billion/month.
21.09.2011 FOMC Statement
Maturity Extension Program (“Operation Twist”) announced: 
The Fed will purchase $400 billion of Treasuries with remaining 
maturities of 6 to 30 years and sell an equal amount with 
remaining maturities of 3 years or less; MBS and agency debt 
principal payments will no longer be reinvested in Treasuries, but 
instead in MBS.
22.06.2011 FOMC Statement
QE2 fi nishes: Treasury purchases will wrap up at the end of 
month, as scheduled; principal payments will continue to be 
reinvested.
03.11.2010 FOMC Statement QE2 announced: Fed will purchase $600 billion in Treasuries.
15.10.2010 Bernanke Speech Bernanke reiterates that Fed stands ready to further ease policy.
12.10.2010 FOMC minutes released
FOMC members’ “sense” is that “[additional] accommodation may 
be appropriate before long…”
Tab. 1: FED´s QE related announcements (Part 1)
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These announcements from the FED, 
together with the daily close prices of 
mentioned indices represented key information 
and input data for our event-study. While 
the methodology itself appears simply to 
use, for proper interpretation and avoiding 
any misunderstanding, detailed analysis of 
information provided in the FOMC minutes and 
statements was needed. On the other hand, 
clear isolation of the QE related information is 
not entirely possible. Accepting limitations of 
this methodology, potential spill-overs to other 
equity markets will not be examined due to 
inconsistency in trading hours.
However, based on studies examining long-
term effects of the QE on the equity markets 
(see e.g. Shah et al., 2018; Su & Hung, 2017; 
Fratzscher et al., 2017), our main hypothesis 
was, that the major equity gauges will respond 
positively on particular announcement day if 
the QE is announced or expanded with respect 
to time or duration, in compared to other 
announcement days where such an information 
is not provided. Consequently, we assume 
the equity indices would react negatively if 
announcement consists information linked to 
tapering or normalization of monetary policy.
3. Results
In Tab. 2 below we present calculated excess 
returns on the observed indices on particular 
announcement days (events), while the returns 
above one percent or below minus one percent 
are shown bold. We can observe more volatile 
reactions during the 2008-2010 period, which 
we consider as a fragile crisis and post crisis 
period, when the monetary authority (FED) 
was becoming even closely watched by the 
market participants – also starting with massive 
support for damaged economy. These initial 
overreactions (mostly due to fresh crisis 
sentiment and the FED under adaptation 
Date Event Description
21.09.2010 FOMC Statement
FOMC emphasizes low infl ation, which “is likely to remain 
subdued for some time before rising to levels the Committee 
considers consistent with its mandate.”
27.08.2010 Bernanke Speech Bernanke suggests role for additional QE “should further action prove necessary.”
10.08.2009 FOMC Statement Balance sheet maintained: The Fed will reinvest principal payments from LSAPs in Treasuries.
04.11.2009 FOMC Statement LSAPs downsized: Agency debt purchases will fi nish at $175 billion.
23.09.2009 FOMC Statement LSAPs prolonged: Agency debt and MBS purchases will fi nish at the end of 2010:Q1.
12.08.2009 FOMC Statement LSAPs prolonged: All purchases will fi nish by the end of October, not mid-September.
18.03.2009 FOMC Statement
LSAPs expanded: Fed will purchase $300 billion in long-term 
Treasuries and an additional $750 and $100 billion in MBS 
and GSE debt, respectively.
28.01.2008 FOMC Statement Fed stands ready to expand QE and buy Treasuries.
16.12.2008 FOMC Statement First suggestion of extending QE to Treasuries by FOMC.
01.12.2008 Bernanke Speech First suggestion of extending QE to Treasuries.
25.11.2008 FOMC Statement LSAPs announced: Fed will purchase $100 billion in GSE debt and $500 billion in MBS.
Source: own elaboration using data from FED.
Note: Fratzscher et al. (2017) used same announcements in reference period from 2008 to 2010, Sosvilla-Rivero & 
Fernández-Fernández (2015) used similar announcements along with ECB announcements.
Tab. 1: FED´s QE related announcements (Part 2)
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process) diminished mostly over the reference 
period as stable and foreseeable forward 
guidance took place (see e.g. Yu, 2018; Xing, 
2018).
In average, the excess returns on the indices 
during the reference period on announcement 
days were positive: DJIA +0.12%, NASDAQ 
+0.16%, RUSSELL2000 +0.04%, S&P500 
+0.16%, which is slightly above the average 
daily returns over the reference period 
except from RUSSELL2000 (DJIA +0.03%, 
NASDAQ +0.05%, RUSSELL2000 +0.04%, 
S&P500 +0.03%), but we do not consider 
this interpretation as signifi cant enough to 
support our main assumptions. Firstly, average 
returns are small and secondly, there are 
some specifi c announcements in our sample 
that needs individual approach. In other 
words, as mentioned earlier, the character of 
announcement would be important.
On December 1st, 2008, the FED chairman, 
Ben Bernanke fi rstly suggested expanding 
FED´s purchases to Treasuries (debt 
obligations issued by the US government), 
Date Event DJIA NASDAQ RUSSEL2000 S&P500
13.12.2017 FOMC Statement 0.17% 0.09% 0.47% -0.15%
20.09.2017 FOMC Statement 0.11% -0.14% 0.32% 0.02%
14.06.2017 FOMC Statement 0.18% -0.50% -0.64% -0.15%
29.10.2014 FOMC Statement -0.25% -0.41% -0.32% -0.20%
18.12.2013 FOMC Statement 1.78% 1.04% 1.25% 1.58%
12.12.2012 FOMC Statement 0.02% -0.20% -0.62% 0.09%
13.09.2012 FOMC Statement 1.48% 1.23% 1.16% 1.53%
22.08.2012 FOMC minutes released -0.32% 0.09% -0.44% -0.09%
20.06.2012 FOMC Statement -0.05% 0.13% -0.19% -0.10%
21.09.2011 FOMC Statement -2.41% -1.97% -3.45% -2.85%
22.06.2011 FOMC Statement -0.66% -0.65% -0.78% -0.63%
03.11.2010 FOMC Statement 0.12% 0.07% 0.09% 0.23%
15.10.2010 Bernanke Speech -0.45% 1.17% -0.49% 0.04%
12.10.2010 FOMC minutes released -0.08% 0.43% 0.06% 0.19%
21.09.2010 FOMC Statement -0.07% -0.43% -0.94% -0.40%
27.08.2010 Bernanke Speech 1.64% 1.71% 2.90% 1.68%
10.08.2010 FOMC Statement -0.53% -1.22% -1.93% -0.60%
04.11.2009 FOMC Statement 0.21% -0.16% -1.34% 0.01%
23.09.2009 FOMC Statement -1.06% -0.95% -1.50% -1.25%
12.08.2009 FOMC Statement 1.14% 1.23% 1.55% 0.99%
18.03.2009 FOMC Statement 1.51% 2.12% 3.79% 2.34%
28.01.2009 FOMC Statement 2.56% 3.63% 3.89% 3.46%
16.12.2008 FOMC Statement 4.42% 5.78% 7.20% 5.46%
01.12.2008 Bernanke Speech -7.37% -8.39% -11.22% -8.46%
25.11.2008 FOMC Statement 0.87% 0.21% 2.24% 1.24%
Source: own elaboration using daily close prices from Investing.com
Tab. 2: Excess returns of main indices on announcements days
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which immediately caused portfolio rebalancing 
towards mentioned treasuries from the equities, 
therefore we have seen signifi cant sell-off in the 
equities on that announcement day. Another 
catalyst for following drop was information 
about the economy (macroeconomic data, such 
as GDP) contained in his speech, which were 
negative (negative macro economy outlook 
and revised-down macro economy data). If 
we exclude this particular announcement day 
from our dataset, we can observe signifi cant 
average positive returns: DJIA +0.43%, 
NASDAQ +0.51%, RUSSEL2000 +0.51%, 
S&P500 +0.52%. Out of the 25 (24 if above 
mentioned announcement is excluded) 
observed announcements, majority of 
reactions were positive: DJIA 14, NASDAQ 14, 
RUSSEL2000 12, S&P500 14. Average upside 
on announcement days with positive market 
reaction was: DJIA +1.16%, NASDAQ +1.35%, 
RUSSEL +2.08%, S&P500 +1.35%. On the 
other hand, average declines on equity indices 
if market reaction was negative are signifi cantly 
smaller: DJIA -0.39%, NASDAQ -0.66%, 
RUSSEL2000 -1.05%, S&P500 -0.40%. To sum 
up these basic fi ndings from trading perspective, 
opening a long position on DJIA, NASDAQ and 
S&P500 (RUSSEL2000 gives us only 50% 
winning chance which we consider ineffective) 
on FED announcement day would give us 58% 
probability of 1.16% gain on DJIA, 1.35% on 
NASDAQ and 1.35% on S&P500 respectively, 
while we face downside risk of -0.39% on DJIA, 
-0.66% on NASDAQ and -0.40% on S&P500, 
respectively, in 42% of situations. These results 
lead to conclusion, that the profi table trading 
strategy can take place in the future under 
specifi c circumstances.
In order to stick to our main hypothesis, that 
the announcements linked to announcing and 
prolonging (with respect to time or duration) 
the QE programmes should cause positive 
reaction on the equity indices, we identifi ed 12 
announcements containing such an information 
(Tab. 3 – group 1). Rest of the announcements 
(Tab. 3 – group 2) contained different type of 
the QE linked information (including tapering 
and policy normalization).
From Tab. 3 we see that the average excess 
return on group 1 announcement days remains 
in highly positive range, where DJIA, NASDAQ 
and RUSSEL2000 reacted positively in 75% of 
Group 1 Group 2
Date DJIAp NASDAQp RUSSEL2000p S&P500p Date DJIA NASDAQ RUSSEL2000 S&P500
12.12.2012 -0.02% -0.28% -0.67% 0.04% 13.12.2017 0.33% 0.20% 0.55% -0.05%
13.09.2012 1.55% 1.33% 1.30% 1.63% 20.09.2017 0.19% -0.08% 0.35% 0.06%
20.06.2012 -0.10% 0.02% -0.30% -0.17% 14.06.2017 0.22% -0.41% -0.59% -0.10%
03.11.2010 0.24% 0.27% 0.32% 0.37% 29.10.2014 -0.18% -0.33% -0.27% -0.14%
12.10.2010 0.09% 0.65% 0.37% 0.38% 18.12.2013 1.84% 1.15% 1.33% 1.66%
27.08.2010 1.65% 1.65% 2.83% 1.66% 22.08.2012 -0.23% 0.21% -0.34% 0.02%
23.09.2009 -0.83% -0.69% -1.18% -1.01% 21.09.2011 -2.49% -2.01% -3.68% -2.94%
12.08.2009 1.30% 1.47% 1.79% 1.15% 22.06.2011 -0.66% -0.67% -0.81% -0.65%
18.03.2009 1.23% 1.99% 3.48% 2.09% 15.10.2010 -0.29% 1.37% -0.22% 0.20%
28.01.2009 2.46% 3.55% 3.83% 3.36% 21.09.2010 0.07% -0.28% -0.79% -0.26%
16.12.2008 4.20% 5.41% 6.69% 5.14% 10.08.2010 -0.51% -1.24% -2.00% -0.60%
25.11.2008 0.43% -0.50% 1.46% 0.66% 04.11.2009 0.31% -0.09% -1.31% 0.10%
Average 1.02% 1.24% 1.66% 1.27% - -0.12% -0.18% -0.65% -0.22%
Source: own elaboration using daily close prices from Investing.com.
Note: Announcement made on December 1st, 2008 consisted fi rst and unprecedent information about QE, which caused 
massive portfolio rebalancing towards fi xed income from equities, we consider as an outlier hence we do not include it.
Tab. 3: Grouped announcements days
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occasions, and S&P500 returned positively on 
83.33% of observed days. In comparison to the 
second group, where average excess returns 
fell into negative range, we can conclude that 
these results are in line with our hypothesis, 
that the equity indices tend to react positively 
on announcing, prolonging or expanding the 
QE programmes linked information (Note: 
separate Mann-Witney U-tests for each index 
indicated rejecting null hypothesis, that the 
groups 1 and 2 are equal on 95% confi dence 
level; p-values: DJIA 0.019, NASDAQ 0.016, 
RUSSEL2000 0.004, S&P500 0.006. Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests for group 1 indices indicated 
rejecting null hypothesis that the medians are 
equal to zero in favour of alternative hypothesis 
that medians are above zero; p-values: DJIA 
0.010, NASDAQ 0.021, RUSSEL2000 0.010, 
S&P500 0.006).
Additionally, if we take a closer look at the 
last three announcements in our dataset (June, 
September and December of 2017) which 
contains information about the “tapering”, 
or shrinking infl ated balance sheet, we see 
mixed returns, without possibility of clear 
interpretation, where only the DJIA stayed in 
positive zone after all three announcements 
(average +0.15%). Logically, we consider these 
tapering linked information as a part of the QE, 
therefore we add them to our dataset. Based 
on those (only three) included observations 
of tapering-linked announcements, we cannot 
prove nor deny our assumption about negative 
reactions following such information. If history 
provides some guidance, we already faced one 
signifi cant tapering contained announcement 
in December 18th, 2013, when initial reaction 
was positive: DJIA +1.84%, NASDAQ +1.15%, 
RUSSEL2000 +1.33%, S&P500 +1.66%, which 
is against our assumption, that the tapering (or 
policy normalization) linked information should 
cause negative initial reaction on the equity 
markets. However, after such a positive initial 
reaction, consequently, we faced so-called 
“taper tantrum”, which lead to sell-offs in bonds, 
equities and commodities, with effects spilled-
over also to the emerging markets. Back then 
it was unprecedented move from the FED (also 
inevitable), which triggered mentioned sell-offs, 
while in today´s environment we have even 
clearer forward guidance and communication 
policy from the FED. Anyway, we do not see 
straightforward positive or negative reactions, 
and we consider the equity market participants 
not fully accommodated to this policy. If we 
remove those three announcements from our 
sample, we get even more positive reactions 
in average, which is in favour of previous 
assumption that the QE related information 
caused positive reactions on the equity markets.
Another more volatile announcement 
came in September 21st, 2011, when the 
FOMC statement revealed “operation twist” 
programme. The equity indices fell sharply, from 
our perspective because of same reason as in 
the 2008´s announcement – market participants 
shifted their portfolios from the equities towards 
the mortgage backed securities (MBS), while 
after negative initial market reaction, positive 
returns followed. But if we look at August 27th, 
2010, when Bernanke mentioned additional (or 
expanded) QE only as an option that should 
take place later, the initial reaction of market 
participants was very positive again not only 
on the stock markets, but also on bonds and 
commodities.
This leads us to conclusion, that if we exclude 
unanticipated and initial announcements of the 
QE programmes that cause rebalancing of 
investors´ portfolios from the equities to other 
types of assets, equity markets tend to react 
positively on the QE linked announcements, to 
prolongation or expansion with respect to time 
or duration, respectively.
4. Discussion
Based on the results, we consider effects of the 
QE announcements on the equities as positive, 
which is in line with studies examining the long-
term relationship and effects such as Chen et 
al. (2012), Fratzscher et al. (2017), Shah et 
al. (2018) or Su and Hung (2017). However, 
from short-term or trading perspective, we 
found some implications that require further 
explanation. Firstly, we can expect positive 
excess returns on the stock indices, only when 
announcement is containing information about 
preservation, expanding, or prolonging current 
programme. Realizing long term positive 
effect of the QE on the equities, additional 
reassuring from such an announcement that 
the FED will not change its´ path of the QE 
cause positive actions. On the other hand, 
on the announcement introducing new QE 
type programme (announcement containing 
initial information about a new programme) 
we can expect sell-off in equities, which is 
caused by rebalancing the portfolios towards 
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assets directly linked to the programme being 
announced. This, even from the short-term 
perspective, supports the portfolio rebalancing 
channel, broadly discussed and examined in 
literature from long-term perspective (see e.g. 
Hausken & Ncube, 2013; Krishnamurthy & 
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Joyce et al., 2011; 
Gertler & Karadi, 2011). In the background 
of this transmission channel we also see the 
fact that investors´ taste for assets that are 
becoming more expensive, with lower yield, 
will decrease, and they will seek higher yield 
among the riskier assets such as equities. 
Rebalancing in broader way may also lead to 
spill-overs when agents seek cheaper or similar 
assets abroad (see e.g. Falagiarda et al., 2015). 
To conclude, sellers of assets bought under the 
QE will rebalance their portfolios towards other 
assets (Gambetti & Musso, 2017).
Another fi nding is, that in general we can 
observe decreasing trend in the volatility over 
the time. It could be the result, inter alia, of 
two factors; fi rstly, stable and robust demand 
in the credit market, and secondly very stable, 
continuous and consistent narrative from the 
FED offi cials. In other words, after volatile 
period from 2008 to 2010, where the new form 
of forward guidance was being implemented 
(and the signalling channel took place), the 
market participants were getting used to forward 
guidance policy which has resulted in mixed 
reaction. Consequently, fi rm FEDs commitment 
was translated as readiness to continue with 
high accommodative, non-standard instruments 
in order to support the economy, in other words, 
positive. On the other hand, from 2010 onwards, 
we faced much muted market reactions. 
Partially because the market participants were 
oriented mostly on broader economic recovery. 
The monetary policy was supportive, and the 
volatility in general suppressed. This is in line 
with very popular “trade” during the reference 
period – shorting volatility (see e.g. Ghosh & 
Saggar, 2017; Xing, 2018). 
The signalling channel, we consider as 
very important both from longer perspective 
(Hausken & Ncube, 2013; Bhattarai et 
al., 2015; Bernanke, 2004; Eggertsson & 
Woodford, 2003) and short-term perspective – 
if we take into account the market participants´ 
expectations, that the short-term interest rates 
(yields respectively) will remain low in the 
future (based on the communication strategy 
provided by central bank – forward guidance), 
we can observe bidding down yields on long-
term securities, and also pushing up equity 
prices (mainly because of future earnings 
expectations). Putting this into context with our 
second assumption, that the tapering-linked 
information should negatively affect equity 
performance, we do not fi nd signifi cant evidence 
from our last three observed announcements, 
respectively, announcements were followed by 
mixed reactions. On the other hand, after initial 
(and unprecedented) announcement about the 
tapering (December 18th, 2013) we observed 
very positive returns on the equity indices – 
again in favour of the portfolio rebalancing 
transmission channel, however it signalled 
withdrawing from the extremely supportive 
monetary policy which lead to signifi cant 
sell-offs on various assets over next quarter. 
Again, here we mention the signalling channel, 
because after such volatile period caused by 
this policy change, recently we faced much 
smoother and softer communication of tapering 
from the FED, with more time to adapt and 
smaller initial monthly amounts of unwinding 
with gradual rising, using “autopilot” approach. 
We put into context, that mixed reactions are 
partially result of market participants´ memory 
of the “taper tantrum” and partially of much 
softer announcing and approach from the FED. 
However, still we consider the tapering (mostly 
the unwinding of balance sheet) in some way 
as an unprecedented policy, which would need 
further research once the unwinding process 
will be over.
Conclusion
In this paper we focused on the initial market 
reaction on the equity markets after the Federal 
Reserve´s QE linked announcement. Adopting 
the event-study approach previously robustly 
used among other authors with respect to 
the QE, and announcements selected from 
every press release and the FOMC minutes, 
we calculated excess returns on the major 
equity indices in the US. Our results suggest, 
that except from initial (unprecedented and 
unexpected) announcement of the QE, opening 
long position on other announcement days 
would bring profi t with 58% probability (+1.16% 
on DJIA, +1.35% on NASDAQ, +1.35% on 
S&P500), while in 42% of situations we face 
downside risk (-0.39% on DJIA, -0.66% on 
NASDAQ, -0.40% on S&P500). We conclude 
that prolonging, preserving or expanding current 
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programme has positively affected examined 
the equity indices, while initial announcing 
causes declines in the equity markets. These 
fi ndings we found consistent with the portfolio 
rebalancing and signalling transmission 
channels functioning. As far as we consider 
the tapering and balance sheet unwinding as 
a process related to the QE programmes, we 
found no signifi cant evidence of straightforward 
reaction of the equities, mainly because of 
short unwinding period included in our empirical 
study. We also consider the unwinding of 
balance sheet as unprecedented to some 
extent, therefore further research will need to 
be done after the unwinding process is over. 
Taking into account diffi culty to isolate effects 
considered as a reaction only to the QE linked 
information, because of the complexity of 
statements and announcements made by the 
FED, we consider these results signifi cant 
from intraday (or short-term) perspective. 
Results and interpretations should also provide 
information for policymakers, in order to avoid 
unwanted market reactions in future, or to 
place their forward guidance in more effective 
way. Realizing currently ended the QE in the 
European Union, we believe these results 
could be used in some way as a guidance for 
examining the ECB´s announcement respecting 
differences between market conditions in the 
US and the EU.
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Abstract
QUANTITATIVE EASING EFFECTS ON EQUITY MARKETS – EVENT STUDY 
EVIDENCE FROM THE US
Leoš Šafár, Marianna Siničáková
In this paper we examine effects of the QE related statements made by the FED on major equity 
indices in the US. We consider days, when announcements had been made, as events for the 
event-study. We approach this methodology with aim to calculate excess returns on particular 
announcement day for Dow Jones Industrial Average, Standard´s & Poor´s 500, NASDAQ and 
Russell2000. Admitting complexity of those statements, and diffi culty to isolate effects linked only 
to QE related information, we analysed statements individually, to be able to extrapolate deviations 
more accurately. Results indicate positive excess returns (above average performance over previous 
60 days) on each index from 2008 to 2017 in average, while on some specifi c announcements, 
excess returns fell to negative range, which could be explained as misunderstanding of reaction 
function or active portfolio rebalancing towards assets directly infl uenced by the programme 
mentioned in the particular announcement. Considering also multiplicity, for DJIA, NASDAQ and 
S&P500 we conclude, that positive reactions follow especially information linked to prolongation 
or expansion of existing QE programme, while on the other hand initial information about QE 
cause mentioned portfolio rebalancing from equities towards other assets (RUSSEL2000 did not 
signal particular direction in line with announcement days’ information). We can also conclude 
that even if tapering linked information are considered as a part of the QE programmes, we did 
not fi nd signifi cant evidence of neither positive nor negative reaction on particular tapering-linked 
announcements. We add on, that the tapering and balance sheet unwinding are unprecedented to 
some extent, and therefore require further research, especially in current environment where such 
policy normalization is widely discussed.
Key Words: Quantitative easing, event-study, monetary policy, equity markets.
JEL Classifi cation: E520, G140.
DOI: 10.15240/tul/001/2019-2-012
EM_2_2019.indd   187 19.6.2019   15:11:28
